We study the implications of honesty when it requires pre-commitment. Within a two-period hidden information problem, an agent learns his match with the assigned task in period 2 and, if honest, reveals it to the principal if he has committed to it. The principal may offer a menu of contracts to screen ethics. Both honest and dishonest agents are willing to misrepresent their ethics. The principal and dishonest agents benefit from an increased likelihood of honesty as long as honesty is likely enough. Honest agents always profit from ethics uncertainty if a good match is likely. This is also true if dishonesty is likely enough, in which case an honest receives the same surplus as a dishonest.
Introduction
For the past thirty years, a large body of literature has developed on the theme that individuals use their private information in an opportunistic manner. However, evidence suggests that some individuals behave honestly even if they thereby forgo material benefits.
For instance, using data from a firm that kept monitoring at a high level while making the employees believe that it had been relaxed, Nagin et al. (2002) found that only some employees chose to increase the extent of shirking.
1 This heterogeneity in ethics enriches the standard hidden information problem, and raises new questions. Is it possible for an uninformed principal to screen on the basis of ethics? How does it affect her surplus? Are there positive or negative externalities between honest and opportunistic agents?
A first take at defining honesty within the principal-agent model would be to consider that it involves revealing any private information at no cost. However, such a definition does not receive much support from modern psychology. In 1928 Hartshorne and May laid out what is still the basic tenet for much of this literature, namely, that moral behavior cannot be viewed as emanating from "an inner entity operating independently of the situations in which the individuals are placed" (p.385). Instead, the general perception is that behavior is conditional on various factors; in particular, studies have shown that factors such as financial needs, the fear of getting caught, perceived equity, and loyalty all affect the propensity to behave honestly (see, e.g., Spicer and Becker, 1980, and Terris and Jones, 1982) . All these factors would translate differently into a formal model. In a companion paper, we focus on honesty as being conditional on the perceived equity of the contract (Alger and Renault, 2003) . In this paper, we instead look at loyalty as a trigger of honest behavior.
To capture the role of loyalty in information revelation, it is natural to consider situations where two parties contract before all the relevant information is known. Assuming that an individual would choose to commit to reveal information he already holds would be tantamount to viewing honesty as unconditional information revelation. The following two examples illustrate situations where our analysis would be pertinent. An employee may 1 See the references in Alger and Ma (2003) and Alger and Renault (2003) for further examples.
discover how well he is matched with a given task only in the course of performing it:
either because of unforeseen contingencies, or because he has never performed this task before. This may for instance result in different times needed to achieve a given output. In this case an honest employee would reveal this information if he has committed to doing so by signing a pre-specified contract with the employer. In subcontracting situations, such as with plumbers and carpenters, there frequently is ex ante uncertainty pertaining to the cost of the assignment. Typically the subcontractor would learn the relevant information while completing the job, whereas the customer would remain uninformed. A prior discussion of these uncertainties with the house owner might prevent some subcontractors from inflating the cost.
In both examples above, the principal faces an ex ante uncertainty about the agent's ethics. If she could observe whether the agent is honest or opportunistic, the standard theory predicts that she would tailor the contract to the agent's ethics: she could achieve a first-best situation with no rent for the agent if he is honest, whereas she would face the classical rent-efficiency trade-off with an opportunistic agent. Previous work involving ethics heterogeneity merely assumed that there was no way of screening ethics. 2 Here we explicitly allow for ex ante ethics screening. Since ethics is known by the agent at the moment of contracting, the honest agent does not feel a commitment to reveal that he is honest. To assume the contrary would again be equivalent to unconditional truthful
behavior, a case we analyze in Alger and Renault (2003) .
We formalize these ideas in a two-period principal-agent setting, where the agent discovers his match in the second period. We assume for simplicity that the match may be either good or bad. The agent may be either opportunistic or honest. In the latter case he would reveal his match truthfully provided that a contract specifying an output level and a monetary transfer contingent on his match has been signed in the first period. At date 1 the principal may offer a menu of contracts in order to screen ethics.
As noted above, the principal would ideally choose to leave no rent to an honest agent, while leaving a rent to an opportunistic agent in order to screen matches. But since an honest agent is willing to lie about his ethics, inducing truthful revelation of the match by an opportunistic agent requires leaving as large a rent for an honest as for an opportunistic agent. Thus the only way for the principal to leave a smaller rent to an honest agent is to allow for misrepresentation of the match by an opportunistic agent. This means that the revelation principle does not apply. Nonetheless we show that the only relevant equilibrium message structures for an opportunistic agent, apart from telling the truth, are either to systematically claim that the match is bad, or to systematically lie about the match. With the former, the principal forgoes any benefit from match screening for an opportunistic agent, but may leave no rent to an honest. The latter enables the principal to screen the match for an opportunistic (because lies are revealing in this case), at the cost of leaving some rent to an honest. However, because a dishonest obtains a rent only by misrepresenting matches, which an honest is not willing to do, an honest agent's rent is smaller than that of a dishonest.
Yet, these two contracts are dominated by the standard incentive-compatible contract, in terms of screening matches for an opportunistic. Therefore, if the probability of honesty is too low the principal gives up trying to leave a lower rent to an honest agent, and offers the standard incentive-compatible contract. If this probability is larger, she gives up optimal match screening for an opportunistic agent in order to reduce the rent for an honest. As mentioned above the options are to either screen matches for an opportunistic agent by using the revealing lies contract, or capture all of the surplus with an honest agent using the non-revealing lies contract. The latter contract specifies first-best quantities and transfers for both match values, independent of ethics, so that a dishonest always produces the quantity corresponding to the bad match. If the probability of a good match is too high, this involves too large a loss so that this contract is dominated by the revealing lies contract. Otherwise, the non-revealing lies contract is optimal if honesty is sufficiently likely.
Our results show that the standard principal-agent analysis is robust to the introduc-tion of a small enough probability that the agent behaves honestly. Indeed, the principal manages to improve over her standard second-best surplus only if honesty is sufficiently likely. In this case, both the principal's and a dishonest agent's surplus increases with the likelihood of honesty. Conversely, an honest agent would rather live in a world where honesty is more unlikely.
In Alger and Renault (2003) , as a benchmark we consider unconditional honesty. The optimal contract leaves no rent to an honest agent, independent of the probability of honesty, so that the standard second-best approach is not robust. 3 This is true whether or not an honest agent is willing to misrepresent his ethics. He may receive a rent only if his behavior is conditional on the contract being fair, which is the main focus of that paper. Here we find that an ex ante opportunistic behavior regarding ethics may result in a rent for an honest agent, even though honesty is not conditional on fairness. The equilibrium contracts are similar; in particular, the robustness of the standard second-best approach is obtained, and the first-best contract is optimal if honesty is sufficiently likely. Alger and Ma (2003) use the same informational structure as here in a substantially different economic environment. An insurance company contracts with a patient and a physician, who may or may not engage in claim inflation, depending on whether he is honest or not. They also find that the standard second-best contract is offered if dishonesty is sufficiently likely. However, the first-best contract is never optimal for a positive probability of dishonesty; this is a result of the insurance motive, which calls for a smaller difference between the allocations associated with an honest and an opportunistic physician.
The next section introduces the formal model. In Section 3, we characterize the optimal contract, and we conclude in Section 4. Proofs are in appendix.
The Model
We model an honest behavior triggered by a commitment to reveal some private information. To this end we consider a two-period framework where a contract is signed in period 1 prior to private information being revealed to the agent. In many situations, there may also be some private information in period 1, however we abstract from it for the sake of simplicity.
Although our model applies to many situations, we specify it to suit the employeremployee relationship. An employer (the principal) hires an individual (the agent) to perform a task with output x. This output gives the principal surplus π(x), where π is a strictly increasing and concave function, with π(0) = 0 and π (0) = +∞. The principal pays the agent a transfer t, so that her net surplus is Π(x, t) = π(x) − t.
There is uncertainty as to how well the agent's abilities match the requirements of the task he is assigned. Let v(x, θ) denote the cost for the agent of producing x units, where the parameter θ represents the match. The match may be either good (θ = θ) or bad (θ =θ),
with the probability of a bad match being α. The cost function v is strictly increasing and strictly convex in x, with v(0, θ) = 0 and v (0, θ) = 0 (the prime indicates a partial derivative with respect to x). Finally, when the match is good, the production cost incurred by the agent is smaller than when it is bad, for any output level:
. This is the standard Spence-Mirrlees condition. 4 The employee's net surplus is the transfer net of the production cost U (x, t, θ) = t − v(x, θ). The agent's reservation utility is normalized to zero. For further reference, the first-best values of x,x * if θ =θ and
, respectively. Given the properties of π and v, they are uniquely defined, andx * < x * . We will call an output with its corresponding transfer an allocation (x, t).
4 The assumptions on the functional forms essentially ensure unique interior solutions. Other applications may require these regularity conditions to be slightly altered. For instance, if the principal is a seller signing a contract with a buyer, x being the quantity supplied, then π would be a decreasing and v an increasing function, and t would be negative. The parameter θ would determine the buyer's willingness to pay. A buyer may feel committed to reveal a high willingness to pay for an artist's work upon having a discussion with the artist.
In the standard setting, the principal would discriminate between a good and a bad match using a mechanism, to be at work in the second period: Definition 1 (Mechanism) A mechanism m, defines a space M 2 of messages µ 2 and a mapping y m : M 2 → IR + × IR + , where IR + × IR + is the set of feasible allocations.
A mechanism is said to be direct if the message space is the set of the agent's types,
The principal faces an additional uncertainty, regarding the agent's ethics, denoted k:
with probability γ ∈ (0, 1), the agent is dishonest (k = d), and with the complementary probability, he is honest (k = h). 5 The agent knows his ethics during the whole game, and it is his private information. A dishonest agent always maximizes his surplus, like in any standard principal-agent setting. By contrast, an honest agent may forego material benefits to truthfully announce his type θ (at date 2). As argued in the introduction, however, honest behavior is typically not automatic. Here, we view honesty as being triggered by a sense of commitment. Formally we assume that honest behavior at date 2 occurs only if the principal offers a contract at date 1:
Definition 2 (Contract) A contract C defines a space M 1 of messages µ 1 that may be sent by the agent at date 1, and a mapping c : M 1 → M where M is the set of mechanisms m (see definition 1).
However, offering a contract is not sufficient to induce honest behavior. The mechanism to be at work at date 2 must also be direct. In an indirect mechanism, telling the truth is a fuzzy notion 6 so that an honest agent does not feel committed to revealing his true type, and he then behaves as if he were dishonest. Formally, honesty is equivalent to the following restriction on the message space at date 2:
Assumption 1 (Ethics I) (Messages at date 2) (i) A dishonest may announce any µ 2 ∈ M 2 .
(ii) In any direct mechanism signed in a date 1 contract, an honest with match θ ∈ {θ,θ} must announce θ.
(iii) If no contract is signed at date 1, or in any indirect mechanism, an honest agent may announce any µ 2 ∈ M 2 .
Since no contract has been signed prior to date 1 an honest agent does not feel committed to revealing his ethics. 7 Formally, we have:
Assumption 2 (Ethics II) Whether the agent is honest or dishonest, he may announce
As a benchmark we describe the optimal contracts if ethics were known. First, if the principal knew that the agent is honest, she would implement the first-best decisions and extract the whole surplus by offering a contract with one message leading to the first-best mechanism:
Definition 3 (First-best mechanism) The first-best mechanism, denoted m * , defines M 2 = {θ,θ}, and the mapping: (x * ,t * ) if µ 2 =θ, and (x * , t
If the agent is known to be dishonest, the revelation principle applies and the mechanism that maximizes the principal's expected surplus may be found by imposing individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. This yields the standard second-best mechanism:
Definition 4 (Standard second-best mechanism) The standard second-best mechanism, denoted m s , defines M 2 = {θ,θ}, and the mapping: (x s ,t s ) if µ 2 =θ, and (x s , t s ) if
Whereas θ is arguably verifiable information, an individual's ethics are much harder to actually observe. Thus, even a potentially honest agent may not be afraid of getting caught lying.
In equilibrium, the agent receives a rent if the match is good, and the allocation is suboptimal if the match is bad.
If ethics is the agent's private information, and if the first-period menu offered by the principal comprises the first-best and the standard second-best mechanism, the agent always selects the wrong mechanism from the principal's viewpoint. We next turn to determining the optimal contract.
Analysis

Preliminaries
The standard approach to the present asymmetric information problem would rely on the revelation principle, whereby for any contract there exists a direct incentive compatible contract that implements the same allocation in every state of nature. Here it is straightforward to prove that this principle does not hold. Consider the following contract:
In equilibrium, the honest agent reveals θ truthfully and gets no rent. The dishonest agent always announcesθ; he gets no rent if θ =θ, and the rent
According to the revelation principle, there should exist a menu of direct mechanisms (m h , m d ) yielding the same allocations as the original ones in every state of nature, and inducing the agent to tell the truth. Therefore, m d must specify the allocation (x * ,t * ) whether the agent announces θ orθ. As a result, for the honest agent to reveal h truthfully, m h must give him an expected rent
which yields a contradiction with the requirement that the allocation should be the same in every state of nature. Hence the revelation principle does not hold in our framework.
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Given that, the agent's equilibrium behavior is a priori not predictable. At first sight, the task to determine the optimal contract thus seems daunting. Fortunately, the following two observations facilitate the determination of the optimal contract.
First, because honest behavior is conditional on the mechanism being direct, the principal will use direct mechanisms only. It is straightforward to verify that for any contract involving some indirect mechanism, there is a contract comprised of direct mechanisms to which it is equivalent. Hence, the message sent by the agent at date 2 is of the form θ ∈ {θ,θ}. For further use below, letθ * (θ, m) denote the agent's best response in mechanism m if his match is θ, and µ * 1 (k) the best response at date 1. As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that whenever an agent is indifferent between revealing the truth and lying, he reveals the truth.
Second, we may assume that the agent truthfully reveals his ethics at date 1, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Without loss of generality, attention may be restricted to contracts C that define the message space M 1 = {h, d} and that induce truth-telling at date 1, i.e, µ *
Lemma 1 implies that we may impose two date 1 incentive compatibility constraints ensuring that an honest agent announces h while a dishonest agent announces d. We may now use a lighter notation: a mechanism m k , where k ∈ {h, d}, specifies the allocation (x k , t k ) if the date 2 message is θ, and (x k ,t k ) if the date 2 message isθ.
Given that the equilibrium behavior of the agent is not known a priori, we have to determine the contracts that are optimal conditional on assumed behavior, before being able to determine the equilibrium contract. We start by analyzing mechanisms that do induce truth-telling at date 2 by the dishonest agent, before turning to mechanisms inducing lies.
Incentive-compatible contracts
Here we assume that in equilibrium a dishonest agent reveals θ at date 2: ∀θ ∈ {θ,θ} we haveθ
Thus the principal chooses the pair of mechanisms
For the agent to reveal his ethics at date 1, the following incentive compatibility constraints must hold:
An honest agent reveals θ truthfully irrespectively of the mechanism chosen at date 1. Therefore, the incentive constraint for the honest type (1) is straightforward. In contrast, we do not know the dishonest agent's behavior if he were to claim to be honest at date 1: therefore, the right-hand side of constraint (2) is not based on truth-telling. However, by assumption, the dishonest agent truthfully reveals θ in equilibrium, yielding the expression on the left-hand side of the constraint. Second, for the dishonest agent to reveal his type θ in equilibrium, two incentive compatibility constraints must hold, but as is standard only the following is binding:
Finally, the participation constraints are:
Proposition 1 The optimal contract inducing the dishonest to reveal his true θ is to offer the standard second-best mechanism independent of the announced ethics.
The intuition is as follows. The principal must give the dishonest agent a rent to make him reveal θ at date 2. But since the honest agent behaves opportunistically at date 1, she must give him the same rent. As a result, the optimal contract is as if the agent were dishonest with certainty. Proposition 1 indicates that the only way to leave a smaller rent to the honest than to the dishonest agent is to let the dishonest agent manipulate the information at date 2.
Contracts inducing lies
From Lemma 2 we may without loss of generality impose date 1 incentive compatibility constraints, which ensure truthful ethics revelation. Which type of second period incentive compatibility constraints should be imposed, depends on the assumed equilibrium and outof-equilibrium behavior of the dishonest agent; the exact formulation of all constraints also depends on this. Our first goal is to restrict the set of such equilibrium and out-ofequilibrium behavior. This is achieved by the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If m d does not induce the dishonest agent to reveal the truth at date 2, then (i) in equilibrium, the dishonest agent either sends the messageθ =θ independently of his type, or always sends a false message so thatθ =θ when he is of type θ andθ = θ when he is of typeθ.
(ii) if the dishonest agent were to pick m h , he would send the messageθ =θ independently of his type.
Regarding the out-of-equilibrium messages, it would clearly not be optimal to design m h so as to induce the dishonest to reveal θ truthfully, as that would simply bring us back to the incentive-compatible case. It is also intuitive that the principal should not induce the dishonest with typeθ to announce θ in m h ; then there would be no benefit to screening matches for honest agents, since an agent with a good match should be paid as much as an agent with a bad match for a given output. This argument does not apply to a dishonest agent's equilibrium messages: if a dishonest agent of typeθ announces θ, the principal may still screen matches by letting him announceθ if his type is θ .
We can now proceed to characterizing the optimal contract, conditional on some assumed equilibrium behavior. As implied by Lemma 2, we need to consider only two cases: the revealing lies case (when he always lies in equilibrium, the principal can infer θ), and the non-revealing lies case (the dishonest agent always claims θ =θ in equilibrium).
In the revealing lies case the principal chooses the pair of mechanisms
In the appendix we verify that the only binding constraints are the incentive compatibility constraints ensuring that the agent reveals whether he is honest or dishonest:
and the participation constraints corresponding to a bad match, which is given by (4) for an honest and by
for a dishonest. The following proposition describes the optimal revealing lies contract.
Proposition 2 (Revealing lies) For γ < 1/2, the optimal contract inducing the dishonest to always lie in equilibrium is such thatx
Both the honest and the dishonest obtain a rent, however it is lower for the honest thanks to the message reversal. Here the rent-efficiency trade-off is implied by the ethics incentive compatibility constraints being binding. If a dishonest claimed to be honest he would earn a rent by pretending that the match is bad when it is good, while if an honest agent claimed to be dishonest he would earn a rent by telling the truth when the match is good. Hence the rent of an honest depends positively on x d , whereas that of a dishonest depends positively onx h . This in turn implies that the quantitiesx h and x d are distorted downwards, and depend on the probability that the agent is dishonest. Since for γ < 1/2 it is more likely that the agent is honest, the downwards distortion is more pronounced for x d than forx h ; moreover, we have x d <x s <x h ,x h is increasing and x d decreasing in γ, and both tend tō x s as γ tends to one half. Thus, the honest agent's rent rises as the probability that the agent is dishonest becomes larger; in fact, the mechanism intended for the honest agent tends toward the first-best mechanism as that probability tends to zero.
Finally, the proposition only specifies an optimal revealing lies contract for values of γ less than 1 2
. In this case the optimal allocation obtained by taking into account only the ethics incentive compatibility constraints satisfies the strict inequalities ensuring that the dishonest always lies; those are strict because of our tie-breaking rule that when indifferent the agent tells the truth. When γ > 1 2 these inequalities would not hold for the allocation specified in the proposition. There is actually no optimal revealing lies contract in this case because the set of revealing lies contract is not a closed subset of IR 8 . However, the surplus that the principal can achieve with a revealing lies contract is strictly less than with the standard second-best contract if γ > 1 2
. To see this, note that the set of revealing lies contracts would be larger without the tie-breaking rule; without this rule it can be verified that the optimal revealing lies contract implements the standard second-best allocations.
The intuition is as follows. As we pointed out above, for γ below one half the principal chooses a lower quantity for a dishonest with a bad match than for an honest with a bad match (x d <x s <x h ), because she is more likely to leave a rent to an honest than to a dishonest. By the same token, for γ above one half, she would like to leave a smaller rent to a dishonest agent than to an honest, which would requirex h <x s < x d . This however would violate the second period constraint ensuring that a dishonest with a good match choosesx d . The latter constraint is therefore binding, and along with the first period ethics incentive constraints, it induces the principal to implement the standard second-best allocations.
In the non-revealing lies case the principal chooses the pair of mechanisms
To characterize the optimal contract in this case it is enough to take into account the participation constraints (4) for k = h, d, and (5) for k = h.
Proposition 3 (Non-revealing lies) An optimal contract inducing the dishonest to always claim that the match is bad is to offer the first-best mechanism independent of the announced ethics.
The non-revealing lies contract implements the first-best allocations if the agent is honest, whereas the allocation is independent of the match if the agent is dishonest. 
The equilibrium contract
Having determined the contracts that are optimal conditional on the three relevant message structures, we can characterize the unconditional equilibrium. First note that the optimal revealing lies contract strictly dominates the standard second-best contract for γ < 1 2 , and that they yield the same surplus for γ = 1 2 . Recall also that the standard second-best dominates any revealing lies contract for γ > 1 2 . These two contracts define the largest surplus that the principal can achieve while screening matches for the dishonest. Hence to derive the equilibrium contract we need to compare this surplus with that obtained with the first-best contract. Figure 1 , where the two relevant surpluses (first-best and match screening) are drawn as a function of γ, depicts the three situations that may arise. We show in the proof of Proposition 4 that the surplus curves are as shown in the picture (Π S denotes the surplus with the standard second-best contract, Π R the surplus derived from the revealing lies contract, and Π * the surplus associated to the first-best contract).
In panel (a) the first-best surplus curve always lies beneath the match screening surplus curve, so that the equilibrium contract is whichever match screening contract is relevant.
As we will see in the proposition below, this occurs when the probability of a bad match is small. Intuitively this makes sense, since resorting to the first-best contract is costly only when the match is good. By contrast, when this probability is large, offering the first-best contract is always optimal when dishonesty is sufficiently unlikely, as shown in panels (b) and (c). Then the equilibrium contract depends on whether the first-best surplus crosses the second-best surplus above or below γ = 1 2
. In the former case, the revealing lies contract is never optimal (panel c), whereas in the latter case it is optimal for intermediate values of
In Alger and Renault (2003) , where we are also led to compare the surpluses derived from offering the first-best and second-best contracts, we show that the threshold value for γ above which the second-best dominates the first-best contract, γ * , is strictly increasing in α, the probability of a bad match. We also find that it is bounded above bŷ
These results may be summarized as follows.
Proposition 4 There exists a unique γ * ∈ (0, 1) and there exists a uniqueᾱ ∈ (0, 1) such that:
1. If α <ᾱ: the incentive-compatible contract is optimal if and only if γ ≥ 1/2, whereas the revealing lies contract is optimal if and only if γ < 1/2.
2. If α ≥ᾱ, the incentive-compatible contract is optimal if and only if γ ≥ max{γ * , 1/2}, and (i) if γ * < 1/2, there exists a unique γ * * ∈ (0, γ * ) such that the revealing lies contract is optimal if and only if γ * * ≤ γ < 1/2, and the non-revealing lies contract is optimal if and only if 0 ≤ γ < γ * * ;
(ii) if γ * ≥ 1/2, the non-revealing lies contract is optimal if and only if γ < γ * .
Although the incentive-compatible contract does not allow for any screening along the ethics dimension, it proves to be remarkably robust to the introduction of the possibility that the agent is honest. The probability that the agent is honest must be significantly different from zero for the principal to find it worthwhile to depart from the standard second-best mechanism. It must actually be larger than one half if the bad match is sufficiently unlikely.
Similar robustness results are found in Alger and Ma (2003) and Alger and Renault (2003) .
Thus the principal's surplus is not affected by an increase in the likelihood of honesty if honesty is not likely enough. For larger probabilities of honesty, however, it is all the larger that the probability that the agent is honest is large. The surplus of a dishonest follows a similar pattern: a dishonest gains from the presence of honest agents if only if the probability of honesty rises above the threshold at which the principal drops the standard second-best contract. If the principal switches to the first-best contract at the threshold, then the surplus of a dishonest jumps up and remains unchanged for larger probabilities of honesty. If the switch is towards the revealing lies contract at the threshold, then the surplus of the dishonest increases continuously with the likelihood of honesty, up to the point where the first-best contract is selected. In contrast with both the principal and a dishonest agent, an honest is penalized by an increase of the likelihood of honesty. In the second-best contract he is treated as well as a dishonest agent, but otherwise he receives a smaller or no rent; if he receives a rent, which is the case in a revealing lies contract, it is decreasing in the likelihood of honesty.
The revealing lies contract allows the principal to screen among matches for dishonest agents while leaving a smaller rent to the honest than with the second-best contract. This is the only instance where ethics screening occurs. 10 However, it is clearly a bit unsettling that the principal would be able to fool an honest agent by offering such a contract. Indeed in the mechanism meant for the dishonest, the agent would be asked to commit to producing more with a bad than with a good match. When considering the possibility of lying about his ethics in the first period, an honest agent would likely not consider that this is a reasonable commitment that he should abide to. Furthermore, the ability of the principal to commit to this type of mechanism strongly depends upon her expectation that no honest agent would ever select it; if she assigned a positive probability to such an event, she would have an incentive to renegotiate and offer the standard second-best mechanism instead. This would be accepted by an honest agent since his surplus is larger than what he would obtain by telling the truth in the original mechanism. Our results show that if the option of the revealing lies contract were removed, the principal would be hurt only if a bad match is sufficiently unlikely.
Concluding Remarks
As we saw in the introduction, modern psychology has taught us that it would not be appropriate to view honesty as an unrestrained desire to reveal hidden information. Rather, it should be dependent upon conditions under which the individual is led to choose whether to give up the benefits of an opportunistic behavior. Here we have focused on the role of loyalty in inducing honesty. Ex ante opportunistic behavior regarding ethics revelation enables an honest agent to sometimes garner a rent which would be denied to him if honesty was unconditional. In Alger and Renault (2003) we found that a sense of equity on the part of the agent had the same implication. In fact the outcome under both types of honesty would be very similar. The only difference hinges on the ability of the principal to use the revealing lies contract, which we argued seems rather unrealistic. If this contract may not be used, in both settings we find endogenously that the principal chooses not to screen on the basis of ethics, and offers the standard second-best contract if honesty is unlikely, and the first-best contract otherwise.
In our analysis we have exogenously assumed the nature of an honest behavior and the conditions under which it would emerge (loyalty or fairness). Research on this topic should evolve towards endogenizing these aspects as being the result of dynamic social interactions, derived from basic underlying preferences.
We can add these two constraints to the program, since they are implied by constraints
(1) and (2). Let us now omit constraints (1) and (2), and find the solution to the relaxed program: maximize the expected utility subject to the constraints (3)-(13). By inspection, we note that we can split this program into the following two programs: for k = d and
, subject to the constraint (3) and the relevant part of constraints (4) and (5) for k = d, and subject to the constraints (12), (13) and the relevant part of constraints (4) and (5) for k = h. These programs are identical in structure, and therefore have the same solution, so that m(h) = m(d). The omitted constraints (1) and (2) are satisfied.
The solution is then trivial, since the maximization problem is well-known from standard principal-agent models.
Q.E.D.
The following result is used in several subsequent proofs.
Claim 1 In an optimal contract where the dishonest agent does not reveal θ truthfully, the mechanism for the honest is such that x h ≥ x * andx h ≤x * .
Proof: First we prove that x h ≥ x * . Suppose it is not the case. If the principal increases x h , this increases social surplus; thus, if the transfer t h is increased so as to keep the honest agent's surplus unchanged, the principal's surplus increases as long as the dishonest still reveals ethics truthfully. We now check that this is the case. If the dishonest pretends he is honest, his surplus would be the same as in the original contract if he announcesθ, and would be at most that of the original contract if he announces θ. Hence the corresponding expected surplus is lower than what he got by lying about ethics in the original contract.
A symmetric argument can be used to show thatx h ≤x * .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
Possible equilibrium messages are:
and possible out-of-equilibrium messages are:
Eliminating O4: O4 requires standard incentive compatibility constraints in m(h). Then, as in the proof to Proposition 1, the optimal contract is to offer the standard second-best mechanism independent of ethics. Implementing the same allocation while having the dishonest lie in equilibrium would require that he lies if θ = θ (and also if θ =θ); but this contradicts our tie-breaking rule, since in the second-best contract the dishonest is indifferent between lying and telling the truth when θ = θ (see also our discussion following
Lemma 2).
Eliminating O2: O2 requires t h ≥ v(x h ,θ), implying that both the honest and the dishonest get an expected rent which is at least
. Since x h ≥ x * >x s (from Claim 1 above), this rent is strictly larger than with the standard secondbest contract. The principal would therefore be better off with the standard second-best contract.
Eliminating O3: Assume O3. Forθ * (θ, d, m(h)) = θ the following must hold:
Together with Claim 1, this implies t h −t h > v(x h , θ) − v(x h , θ), which implies that
Eliminating E2: Consider a contract (m(d), m(h)) such that the equilibrium messages for the dishonest areθ
Since the dishonest does not send the messageθ, one may without loss of generality assume
For the dishonest of typeθ to announce θ, it must be that he gets a strictly positive The ethics incentive constraint for the honest is satisfied. It remains to be proved that the dishonest's behavior is also unaffected. First, since x h >x h he would still announce θ in mechanism m(h) . A sufficient condition for the dishonest's ethics incentive constraint to be satisfied is that the dishonest's surplus if he is type θ is greater in mechanism m(d) than in mechanism m(h) . This is true ifx d ≥x h , which we now prove. We first show that Moreover, the dishonest's behavior is not affected. The principal's surplus may be written 
Proof of Proposition 2:
We ignore the constraints ensuring the assumed second-period equilibrium and out-ofequilibrium message structures (i.e., E3 and O1); we will verify that they are satisfied by the candidate solution.
We now prove that the ethics incentive constraints are binding. First, note that if the honest pretends he is dishonest, he receives a strictly positive rent if his type is θ, since the allocation (x d , t d ) satisfies the individual rationality constraint for typeθ. The ethics incentive constraint for the honest then implies that at least one of the honest agent's individual rationality constraints is not binding. Thus if the ethics incentive constraint for the honest were slack, the principal could increase her surplus by decreasing one of the transfers for the honest agent. A similar argument shows that the ethics incentive constraint for the dishonest must be binding as well.
We now show that the individual rationality constraints for typeθ, (4) for k = h and (9) 
Since the individual rationality constraint for typeθ in the contract for the honest is binding, this implies that the dishonest's ethics incentive constraint is slack, yielding a contradiction. Now, sincet d − v(x d ,θ) < 0, the honest participates only if his type is θ. Then the argument used to show that the participation constraint for the honest of typeθ is binding can easily be adapted to show that the participation constraint for the dishonest of typeθ is also binding.
The transfers are therefore as in the proposition; replacing them in the objective function and taking first-order conditions yields the quantities in the proposition. Now we verify that the assumed message structures obtain. Given the contract in the proposition, clearly a dishonest with typeθ would behave as assumed, whereas a dishonest with type θ will have the assumed behavior if and only ifx h > x d , which is true when
Proof of Proposition 3:
To begin, note that without loss of generality, we can set
• 
• We can use the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 2 to show that the individual rationality constraint for the honest of typeθ (4) for k = h is binding.
• We show that the participation constraint for the dishonest of typeθ (4) for 
, where the last term represents his surplus if he announces h in the first period. If he is of typeθhe also gets a strictly larger rent by announcing d
than by announcing h. But then the principal could decreaset d .
• We show that the participation constraint for the honest of type θ (5) for k = h is binding. Suppose that it was not binding. Together with the previous results, this would imply that the ethics incentive constraint for the honest is not binding. But then the principal may increase her surplus by decreasing t h .
• The transfers having been determined, the quantities in the proposition are obtained from the first-order conditions. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Let Π S , Π * , and Π R denote the principal's expected surplus given the optimal incentivecompatible, non-revealing lies, and revealing lies contracts, respectively. Further let the indices h and d indicate the principal's expected surplus conditional on the agent being honest and dishonest, respectively. Letting S(x, θ) = π(x) − v(x, θ) denote total surplus at x given that the agent's type is θ, we have:
First, note that Π S is independent of γ. Second, Π * is linear in γ; the slope is equal to αS(x * ,θ) + (1 − α)S(x * , θ) − (1 − α)[v(x * ,θ) − v(x * , θ)] − [αS(x * ,θ) + (1 − α)S(x * , θ)], which is strictly negative. Finally consider Π R . By the envelope theorem:
Here we assume that γ < . Therefore the above expression is strictly negative for γ < h ,θ) is strictly increasing in γ, and the term multiplying 1 − α is also increasing in γ. Therefore Π R is a strictly decreasing and strictly convex function of γ.
A second step is to note a few relations between the expressions Π S , Π * and Π R , and their implications. First, Π R tends to Π S as γ tends to 1 2
. Together with the above, this implies that Π R > Π S for γ < 1 2
. Second, Π N is equal to the first-best principal's surplus for γ = 0 and falls below the second-best expected surplus Π T as γ tends to 1 (because the second-best mechanism is optimal for γ = 1). Together with the above, this means that for every α, there is a unique γ * ∈ (0, 1) such that Π * = Π T , above which Π * < Π T and below which Π * > Π T . Finally, note that lim γ→0 Π N = lim γ→0 Π R .
We now show that the three cases of the proposition may arise. Since Π * is decreasing and linear in γ, whereas Π R is decreasing and convex in γ, a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-revealing lies contract to be optimal for some values of γ is that Π * be less steep than Π R for γ close to 0. Since we only need to compare It is easy to verify that this holds for α close to 1, whereas it is violated for α close to 0.
We now check whether the left-hand side is monotonic in α, so that there exists a unique threshold valueᾱ such that the left-hand side is equal to zero. The inequality may be written:
The derivative of the left hand side with respect to α is positive if
or, equivalently, if:
This is true since the right-hand side is smaller than S(x * , θ), by the definition of x * .Q.E.D. 
